Dynamic Monetary-Fiscal Interactions and the Role of Monetary Conservatism

The present paper reassesses the role of monetary conservatism in a setting with nominal government debt and endogenous fiscal policy. We assume that macroeconomic policies are chosen by monetary and fiscal policy makers who interact repeatedly but cannot commit to future actions. The real level of public liabilities is an endogenous state variable, and policies are chosen in a non-cooperative fashion. We focus on Markovperfect equilibria and investigate the role of fiscal impatience and monetary conservatism as determinants of the economy�s steady state and the associated welfare implications. Fiscal impatience creates a tendency of accumulating debt, and monetary conservatism actually exacerbates such excessive debt accumulation. Increased conservatism implies that any given level of real liabilities can be sustained at a lower rate of inflation. However, since this is internalized by the fiscal authority, the Markov-perfect equilibrium generates a steady state with higher indebtedness. As a result, increased monetary conservatism has adverse welfare implications.

Channels of Firm Adjustment: Theory and Empirical Evidence

We provide a comprehensive analysis of how firms choose between different expansion and contraction forms, unifying existing approaches from the industrial organization and corporate finance literature. Using novel data covering almost the entire universe of UK firms, we document firms� use of internal adjustment, greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We describe frequency and aggregate importance of the different channels, and show that their use varies systematically with observable firm characteristics, in particular firm size and the magnitude of adjustment. We also demonstrate that there is positive assortative matching on the UK merger market. Based on these facts, we propose a theoretical framework which accommodates all three adjustment channels in a unified setting, and is able to replicate the adjustment and matching patterns found in the data.

Inflation, Investment Composition and Total Factor Productivity

This paper employs a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a financial market friction to rationalize the empirically observed negative relationship between inflation and total factor productivity (TFP). Specifically, an empirical analysis of US macroeconomic time series establishes that there is a negative causal effect of inflation on aggregate productivity. Rather than taking the productivity process as exogenous, the model is therefore set up to feature an endogenous component of TFP. This is achieved by allowing physical investment to be channelled into two distinct technologies: a safe, but return-dominated technology and a superior technology which is subject to idiosyncratic liquidity risk. An agency problem prevents complete insurance against liquidity risk, and the scope for insurance is endogenously determined via the relevant liquidity premium. Since the liquidity premium is positively related to the rate of inflation, the model demonstrates how nominal fluctuations have an influence not only on the overall amount, but also on the qualitative composition of aggregate investment and hence on TFP. The quantitative relevance of the underlying transmission mechanism which links nominal fluctuations to TFP via corporate liquidity holdings and the composition of aggregate investment is corroborated by means of the quantitative analysis of the calibrated model economy as well as a detailed analysis of industry-level and firm-level panel data. Notably, the empirical findings are consistent with both the properties of the agency problem postulated in the theoretical model and its implications for corporate liquidity holdings and physical investment portfolios.

Inflation dynamics under optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary policies

We examine the dynamic properties of inflation in a model of optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary policies. The lack of commitment and the presence of nominally risk-free debt provide the government with an incentive to implement policies which induce positive and persistent inflation rates. We show that this property obtains already in an environment with flexible prices and perfectly competitive product markets. Introducing nominal rigidities and imperfect competition has no qualitative but important quantitative implications. In particular, with a modest degree of price stickiness our model generates inflation dynamics very similar to those experienced in the U.S. since the Volcker disinflation of the early 1980s.

Inflation, Liquidity Risk and Long-run TFP - Growth

This paper demonstrates a negative relation between inflation and long-run productivity growth. Inflation generates long-run real effects due to a link from the short-run nominal and financial frictions to a firm's qualitative investment portfolio. We develop an endogenous growth model whose key ingredients are (i) a nominal short-run portfolio choice for households, (ii) an agency problem which gives rise to financial market incompleteness, (iii) a firm-level technology choice between a return-dominated but secure and a more productive but risky project. In this framework, inflation increases the costs of corporate insurance against productive but risky projects and hence a firm's choice of technology. It follows that each level of inflation is associated with a different long-run balanced growth path for the economy as long as financial markets are incomplete. Finally, we apply U.S. industry and firm level data to examine the relevance of our specific microeconomic mechanism. We find that (i) firms insure systematically against risky R&D investments by means of corporate liquidity holdings, (ii) periods of higher inflation restrain firm-level R&D investments by reducing corporate liquidity holdings.

Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy Without Commitment

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a stochastic economy with imperfectly competitive product markets and a discretionary government. We find that, in the flexible price economy, optimal time-consistent policy implements the Friedman rule independently of the degree of imperfect competition. This result is in contrast to the Ramsey literature, where the Friedman rule emerges as the optimal policy only if markets are perfectly competitive. Second, once nominal rigidities are introduced, the Friedman rule ceases to be optimal, inflation rates are low and stable, and tax rates are relatively volatile. Finally, optimal time-consistent policy under sticky prices does not generate the near-random walk behavior of taxes and real debt that can be observed under optimal policy in the Ramsey problem. A common reason for these results is that the discretionary government, in an effort to asymptotically eliminate its time-consistency problem, accumulates a large net asset position such that it can finance its expenditures via the associated interest earnings.

A Portrait of firm Expansion and Contraction Channels

We present a novel set of stylised facts on forms of firm expansion and contraction, using unique business register data for the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2005. We distinguish between adjustments of employment and turnover at existing establishments, expansions and contractions taking place via greenfield investments and disinvestments, and via acquisitions and sell-offs. We document the relative importance of these three channels and how firms choose between them. We interpret our findings in the light of existing theories of firm dynamics, and propose directions for future theoretical developments.

Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem

We study the monetary instrument problem in a model of optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary policy. The policy problem is cast as a dynamic game between the central bank, the fiscal authority, and the private sector. We show that, as long as there is a conflict of interest between the two policy-makers, the central bank's monetary instrument choice critically affects the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. Focussing on a scenario where the fiscal authority is impatient relative to the monetary authority, we show that the equilibrium allocation is typically characterized by a public spending bias if the central bank uses the nominal money supply as its instrument. If it uses instead the nominal interest rate, the central bank can prevent distortions due to fiscal impatience and implement the same equilibrium allocation that would obtain under cooperation of two benevolent policy authorities. Despite this property, the welfare-maximizing choice of instrument depends on the economic environment under consideration. In particular, the money growth instrument is to be preferred whenever fiscal impatience has positive welfare effects, which is easily possible under lack of commitment.

Essays on Monetary Policy Interactions with Fiscal Policy and Financial Markets

This dissertation aims at contributing to the literature investigating the positive and normative framework for monetary policy. It provides an assessment of macroeconomic (i.e. monetary and to some extent also fiscal) policies by focusing on two rather distinct dynamic general equilibrium environments which help shed light on a number of critical aspects regarding the dynamic conduct of monetary policy. The main questions asked are of both theoretical and empirical nature and concern the way monetary policy interacts with fiscal policy and financial markets: How does nominal government debt shape the incentives faced by monetary policy makers? What is the nature of the monetary time consistency problem when there is interaction with sequential fiscal policy makers? Can the dynamic interplay of monetary and fiscal policies explain the evolution of government debt and inflation? How can we rationalize the negative correlation between inflation and aggregate productivity observed at business cycle frequency? What role do nominal interest rates and the provision of liquidity play in this context? A unifying starting point for the set of models laid out in this thesis are specifications proposing that monetary policy does not operate in isolation, but interacts with other agents or institutions. The first two chapters concentrate on the strategic aspects underlying the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies in an economy characterized by positive amounts of government debt in nominal denomination. Specifically, in order to reexamine the time consistency properties of optimal monetary policy, chapter one poses a dynamic optimal taxation problem where not only monetary, but also fiscal policies are sequentially implemented. Starting from this scenario, the next chapter provides a positive theory of dynamic monetary-fiscal interactions and a reflection on the institution of monetary conservatism, whose role is shown to be inherently determined via its implications for the interaction with fiscal policy. The third chapter takes a different and more empirically oriented route: It elaborates on an incomplete markets environment in order to demonstrate how monetary policy systematically affects an economy's aggregate productivity. Key for this conclusion is to acknowledge that nominal fluctuations induced by monetary policy on the one hand and financial markets' capacity to intermediate scarce liquidity on the other hand interact in a way that has an important influence on corporate activity, thus affecting aggregate productivity

Optimal Opinion Control: The Campaign Problem

Opinion dynamics is nowadays a very common field of research. In this article we formulate and then study a novel, namely strategic perspective on such dynamics: There are the usual normal agents that update their opinions, for instance according the well-known bounded confidence mechanism. But, additionally, there is at least one strategic agent. That agent uses opinions as freely selectable strategies to get control on the dynamics: The strategic agent of our benchmark problem tries, during a campaign of a certain length, to influence the ongoing dynamics among normal agents with strategically placed opinions (one per period) in such a way, that, by the end of the campaign, as much as possible normals end up with opinions in a certain interval of the opinion space. Structurally, such a problem is an optimal control problem. That type of problem is ubiquitous. Resorting to advanced and partly non-standard methods for computing optimal controls, we solve some instances of the campaign problem. But even for a very small number of normal agents, just one strategic agent, and a ten-period campaign length, the problem turns out to be extremely difficult. Explicitly we discuss moral and political concerns that immediately arise, if someone starts to analyze the possibilities of an optimal opinion control.Comment: 47 pages, 12 figures, and 11 table